





The middle of 1976, a year enshrined for most Scottish economists. as the 
bicentennial of Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations", is an exceptionally 
difficult time to discuss the present state of the Scottish economy, and (as 
ever!) an almost impossible instant to be asked to make predictions about 
its future. A year earlier, such a task would have seemed much easier. 
Wages and incomes were steadily rising up towards parity with the U.K. 
average; the Scottish: U.K. unemployment relative was improving out of 
all recognition; the Department of Industry's Scottish economic research 
unit had produced firm evidence that the impact of North Sea oil and gas 
acitivities was responsible for 40,000 much-needed jobs being created in 
Scotland; and, for the first time in recent history, Scotland had apparently 
achieved a small net inward flow of population. While no one would have 
been foolish enough to believe that all of Scotland's problems were on the 
way to being solved, these and most of the other oft-quoted economic 
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indicators seemed to show that Scotland was set fair to move into a new era
of relative economic prosperity. 
A year has passed, and although the long-term economic prognosis for
Scotland remains strongly favourable (and incomparably better than one
could have hoped for twenty years earlier), it is now possible to detect the
first signs of some uncertainty about the ease and the speed with which the
Scottish economy can break out of its past low growth pattern. Some of the
reasons for this recent caution can be seen by looking in a little more detail
at developments of the four major indicators mentioned above. Firstly,
official revisions of the annual estimates of migration announced earlier
this year have turned a supposed net immigration of population into
Scotland over 1973-74 into a net outward flow (albeit an exceptionally small
one), and thus the long record of net annual emigration continues. Further,
figures for 1974-75 show that the level of net emigration has risen sharply
back towards its old level - a development which would have been
expected given the long-established relationship between the level of
unemployment in Scotland and net emigration. 
If there has been a deterioration in Scotland's emigration situation, and
after all there are those who would say that Scotland should count herself as
being fortunate in having an almost static population, then the same cannot
be said of the growth in the employment created by the offshore oil and gas
industries- or can it? The estimates of employment associated with North
Sea oil and gas have risen substantially since mid-1975, and it is now
thought that well over 55,000 people are employed by this sector once
allowances are made for multiplier and other indirect effects. But the
long-term future of many of these jobs has begun to look less secure than
appeared to be the case a year ago, for the relative slowdown in the rate of 
offshore exploration in Western Europe and more especially the current 
hiatus in the placing of orders for production platforms has certainly 
placed a substantial number of these jobs at risk. Indeed, a number of 
isolated individual communities could find themselves being rapidly 
transformed into areas of severe economic distress by mid-1977. What is 
even more certain is that Scotland has already come close to reaching the 
point of maximum employment creation in the oil and gas sector. 
Unemployment in Scotland, traditionally the most important and 
influential of the major economic indicators, has also begun to deteriorate 
compared to the U.K. level if the evidence of early 1976 is to be believed. 
How long such a deterioration will continue is hard to predict from current 
evidence, but if it continues for much of this coming year- and the current 
shortage of orders facing many of the firms in the engineering sectors in 
Scotland suggests it might - then the famed "unemployment relative" 
may well return to its old relationship, although it would be helped if net 
emigration were to remain at a high level in 1976. It should also be noted 
that much of both the long-term improvement and the improvement over 
the past two years in the unemployment relative has been due not so much 
to any real improvement in the Scottish unemployment position, but to the 
relative worsening of the overall U.K. situation. 
Whereas three of the indicators have therefore begun to be seen rather 
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differently over the past year, the same cannot be said of the relative 
improvement of Scottish earnings and wage rates, for these have 
maintained their rise towards U.K. levels, and indeed in some industries 
and for some sub-regions of Scotland, earnings stand above those for the 
U.K. as a whole. The underlying causes of this convergence are still not 
fully understood: part of it is due to industrial structural factors; part is 
certainly due to the long tradition of overtime working in the heavy 
industrial sectors (a little remarked evil); North Sea oil and gas has also 
had an effect, but the growth of national wage-bargaining has perhaps had 
the most important impact. What will be interesting over the next few 
years will be the effect that the recent pay policies have on Scotland's 
earnings position, but in general terms one can expect that the rate of 
improvement will slow down in the future. One thing is clear: it is no longer 
possible to treat Scotland as a low wage area, and this has important 
implications for policy. 
The changes that have taken place in the above, and in other associated 
economic indicators during the past year. therefore make it difficult to 
predict the likely future course of the Scottish economy during the 
immediate future (say to the end of 1977) . Obviously much depends on the 
rate of recovery experienced by the overall U.K. economy, but from the 
Scottish point of view it is not yet possible to tell whether the events of the 
past year represent merely a temporary deviation from an otherwise 
favourable long-term trend, or whether the Scottish economy has reached 
the latest of its post-war series of crises. The only firm conclusions that can 
be drawn are that it is dangerous to generalise on the basis of one year's set 
of figures and that indicators may not be all they're cracked up to be! 
In reality no applied economist engaged on a detailed evaluation of 
Scottish prospects would attempt to monitor the progress of the Scottish 
economy on the basis of four imperfect aggregate indicators such as those 
outlined above, and this brings us to one of the most fundamental problems 
currently facing economists and policy-makers, namely, the sheer 
difficulty of measuring the performance of the Scottish economy. Many of 
the more important economic indicators are only made available in a 
highly aggregated form, and often only after a substantial delay. This 
latter problem is hard to get around in a society where computer-based 
reporting systems are distrusted. Those indicators that are published 
have, at least for Scotland, tended to concentrate on measures relating to 
employment and unemployment. Very little data emerges on more 
important aspects such as the value and volume of industrial production; 
on capital investment; and on productivity. However, this particular 
complaint should not be laid wholly at the door of the government 
statistical agencies, for the nature of modern industry has meant that 
many enterprises, and especially those with a multi-regional nature, no 
longer keep the kind of records that allow regional measures of production 
to be produced in a meaningful way. The result is that in the case of 
production, for example, the Business Statistics Office is forced to employ 
a range of allocative procedures which are largely responsible for the 
seeming convergence of productivity (measured in terms of net 
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output-per-man) at the regional level; these problems have also been
partly responsible for the fact that an index of industrial production 
longer exists for Scotland. It has always struck me as strange that, for
example, industrial enterprises receive large amounts of public sec 
finance under the various industrial and regional development assistance
schemes, and yet are allowed to opt out of providing government with the
economic and statistical information that is required to monitor the
progress and results of such policies. It is akin to giving a patient medicine
and not quite knowing whether he's getting better! However, even if such
intractable problems could be overcome, and they perhaps could be given a
little more determination on the part of the government and a little less
obstruction by bodies such as the C.B.I., the most important determinants
of the economic progress of a country like Scotland will by their very nature
remain unmeasurable. There are problems in defining concepts such as
entrepreneurship; or management ability; or technological change, let
alone in trying to measure and monitor them. This whole question of
economic monitoring provides one of the most exasperating paradoxes in
present-day Scotland, for just at the time when economic and political
events are producing an increased demand for more information about the
changes that are taking place, it is in fact getting harder- at least in key
industrial sectors - to collect, process and publish the information that is
required to evaluate such change. 
This inability to monitor the past and indeed the current performance of
the Scottish economy - except in very broad terms - has also had an
impact on our understanding of the nature of the problems facing the
current generation of policy-makers. Despite a large increase in the
number of applied economists interested in Scottish problems (within
government, local authorities, industry and the universities), and despite
the development of ever more sophisticated and precise methods of
economic analysis, it is clear that only relatively slow progresss has been
made towards identifying the real basic problems and constraints that lie
behind Scotland's comparatively poor economic performance in the
post-war period. But progress there has been, and especially over the last
five years, during which time our understanding of the Scottish economy
has grown rapidly. 
The research that has been undertaken has already had one important
outcome, which is now beginning to influence the economic and industrial
policies that are being applied for, and within, Scotland. This is the growing
conviction that the basic economic problems of Scotland are to be found
principally on the supply side, i.e. within Scottish industries and
enterprises. Anyone with a knowledge of Scottish economic history, and
especially those familiar with, for example, the 1932 Board of Trade
Industrial Survey of the South West of Scotland, or with the 1946 Clyde
Valley Plan (which contains a remarkably perceptive chapter on
industrial development) , will find the current rediscovery of the
supply·side emphasis surprising. But there can be little doubt that until
relatively recently, Scotland's industrial decline was seen as being the
consequence of a steady falling off in international and national demand for
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its products, and government policies were very much orientated towards 
trying to replace these declining sectors by encouraging the immigration of 
enterprises active in the new, growth sectors of the national and 
international economies. No one asked the key question about why it was 
that Scottish enterprises in the so-called declining sectors failed to forsee 
the decline and to respond to the threat of it by developing new markets, 
products and technologies, yet this is precisely the question that must be 
answered and it remains relevant today. As we shall see below, it is one 
that is of crucial importance at present in relation to the oil and gas 
industry. 
In fact the roots of the so-called decline of the Scottish indigenous sector 
(which is essentially an industrial one) probably lie far back in the early 
years of this century, and therefore, the post-1945 problems are very much 
seen as the cumulative consequence of decisions taken (or not taken) in 
earlier periods. Nowhere has the result of the decline of indigenous 
industrial sector been better seen than in West Central Scotland, which 
despite its severe economic problems remains the essential powerhouse of 
the Scottish economy. The hypotheses advanced to explain the root causes 
of the West Central problem are many and varied: the preference for 
conspicuous consumption rather than productive investment in the periods 
of prosperity at the turn of the century (a pointer here perhaps about North 
Sea oil?); the development of second generation entrepreneurial softness; 
the slaughter of proto-entrepreneurs on the Somme; and, more recently, 
the suggestion that the heavy demands made upon Clydeside industry 
during the First World War may have permanently and irreparably 
distorted the structure of the local economy. None of these hypotheses have 
been critically examined, and they offer unlimited opportunities for the 
new generation of econometric historians to make major contributions to 
our present understanding of the forces that shape regional change. It must 
be stressed that such past events are important to our understanding of 
Scotland's current economic situation: their exclusion by many 
economists reflects a mistaken belief that the comparative statics of 
neoclassical economics are more revealing than the long-term dynamics of 
economic growth. 
The recent renewal of interest in the supply-side constraints of Scottish 
industry has been matched by a growing realisation that the other major 
problem that confronts Scotland at the present is that of the decline of her 
major urban areas, not only in the West of Scotland, but also in the Central 
Region, Tayside and the Lothians. In many ways the economic problems of 
the old Scottish cities reflect the declining industrial base of inner urban 
areas, but it is obviously a two-way process. Clydeside remains of course, 
the ultimate urban problem area in North-West Europe, topping as it does 
the lists of nearly every undesirable economic, social and cultural 
indicator. Its older housing is appalling; its industrial base is exceptionally 
weak; its financial problems are daunting; its political government is 
hopelessly inept and- dare one say it- partially corrupt; and much of the 
post-war planning has been characterised by a series of abysmal blunders. 
Yet, it should be stressed that Clydeside is probably only different from 
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other older urban areas in the U.K. in the degree to which these problems
exist. The nature and the causes of urban decline in Scotland are still
imperfectly understood, and it is surprising that more research into the
economics of urban growth and decline has not been undertaken in 
Scotland, especially given that most of its population live in or around
urban areas. 
The case of Glasgow illustrates the need for more work to be done in this
area. Ever since the Clyde Valley Plan of 1946, there has been a continuous
policy of encouraging industry and population to move out of Glasgow to
relocate in the new towns and around the periphery of the city. From a 
housing conditions viewpoint, this approach had much to recommend it, 
but it has consistently neglected the needs of urban industry with the
present dire consequences. Urban industry is admittedly exceptionally
difficulUo understand, but we do know that manufacturing and service
sector enterprises in a city like Glasgow are part of a highly integrated
organic complex of trades and professions which have developed over a 
long period of time. Although much of the industrial decline of inner
Glasgow has probably been due to industrial rather than locational factors, 
the physical planning policies adopted in the post-war period have
persistently failed to understand the nature of the urban economy and 
especially the needs of manufacturing industry. Indeed, in some of the
earlier redevelopment areas, industry was treated very much as a 
planning residual. The regeneration of industry in the inner areas of 
Glasgow will therefore be an important area of policy in the future, but
there are fears that the decline of the inner city economy may already have
got out of hand. Population continues to pouroutofthe city, and some ofthe
more recent population projections for the 1980s are ominous indeed. In 
fact, most of Scotland's annual net migration of population has its base in 
the Strathclyde Region. Other urban areas in Scotland have their economic 
and social problems, but all are dwarfed by the scale of the Clydeside 
problem. However, what is required is not to stand around wringing one's 
hands in despair, but to accept the urban problem as an exciting and 
difficult challenge. 
The industrial and urban problems of Scotland are but two of the many 
constraints to Scottish economic growth that must be overcome in the 
future, if this country is to achieve its undoubted potential. There are many 
other areas of the country's social and economic structure where severe 
problems exist. They require to be examined at greater length than is 
possible in a brief survey such as this, but prime candidates for more 
detailed policy-orientated analysis must include amongst others, 
industrial relations, the balance and sources of puhlic sector expenditure, 
and especially, the crucial topic of housing. Perhaps the final word that 
should be said about the problems existing in the Scottish economy, is that 
we are now fairly certain that we have identified the broad areas of 
concern, but that we have still a long way to go before we can be sure that 
we really understand the causal mechanisms and relationships that 
produce the problems. Until we are much further along in this latter stage, 
it will be difficult to know whether in fact the issues that concern us will be 
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amenable to policy implemented within Scotland. 
If it is hard to identify the teal constraints that exist within Scottish 
industry, or within urban economies, it is also exceptionally difficult to 
isolate the real, cast-iron areas of economic potential that exist. Yet the 
identification of potential economic growth sectors is important if one 
wishes to take some role in steering an economy such as Scotland's. 
Certainly Scotland has a superb natural resource base, and one which is 
probably well suited to the requirements of the coming century. It has also 
an exceptionally well-endowed labour force, even though it has not been 
wisely utilised, and a pool of entrepreneurial talent that future economic 
policies must, as a priority, aim to make more active. It has, despite the 
long history of economic and industrial decline, a substantial number of 
commercial and manufacturing enterprises in both the public and private 
sectors that are both dynamic and profitable, and which therefore deserve 
greater encouragement. Unfortunately, as we shall see below, rather too 
much attention has been devoted to intervening in a negative fashion, but 
there can be little doubt that a fundamental reappraisal of industrial and 
regional policy objectives will be forthcoming. 
However, there are those who feel that any discussion about the 
identification of economic potential must be littered with examples of 
actual individual sectors that are growth candidates. Unfortunately, the 
literature of development economics in both the developed and the third 
world is replete with unfortunate experiences of particular industries or 
products or commodities being labelled as growth sectors, and then turning 
sour. Therefore, to those who would offer fish farming, or armaments 
manufacture, or pollution control devices, or vehicles- to name only some 
of those industries advanced as being suitable for Scotland during the last 
year - I would remind them that only a decade ago, the electronics 
industry was seen as the sector with a golden future in Scotland. The 
labour-shedding that has taken place in this particular industry during the 
present recession has put some of the older "declining" industries to 
shame, and the international economics of the major multinational 
companies involved in the sector would not seem to hold out a prosperous 
long-term future for many of the plants now operating in Scotland. Most of 
the new areas of real potential are, by virtue of their very nature, hard to 
predict, and one would expect such "potential" to reveal itself as the 
economy develops. There are policy initiatives that can be introduced to 
help identify, develop, and often create growth products and sectors, and 
principal among such policies are measures intended to increase the 
amount of applied research and development undertaken in a country, 
thereby raising the level of that particular country's technology. Once 
again, however, the past experience of other countries that have chosen to 
pursue this particular route to international competitiveness does not 
altogether encourage us to believe that it is an infallible method of creating 
potential. If Scotland can become a healthy, growing and competitive 
economy, then its companies and industries will provide the potential 
automatically. 
Policies designed to encourage or direct technological change have 
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always proved to be elusive, but fortunately we can be much surer about
policy requirements in more general terms when discussing the Scottish
economy. There are however two preliminary points that must be made:
both have been made before, but both can bear repeating. Firstly, the very
open nature of the Scottish economy due to its particular industrial mix
(both in product and organisational terms) means that it is firmly linked
into both the United Kingdom and world economies. Because of this there
are distinct limits to the effectiveness of economic and industrial policies
designed to operate in Scotland alone, and until the Scottish economy
develops a greater measure of self-reliance (easy to say, but desperately
difficult to achieve) it is always liable to be blown off any policy course by
the pressure of external events. Secondly, we can be sure that no matter
what policies are developed and employed, the ultimate objectives in terms
of achieving a radical restructuring of the Scottish commercial and
industrial base will not be achieved easily, nor with any great speed:
unfortunately, economic development is neither sudden nor spectacular.
There is only space in this article to discuss very briefly the three policy
areas that I consider to be the most important in the immediate future: the
need to restructure industry; the urgent case for adopting a national urban
development strategy; and the rather special case of oil and gas. 
Perhaps the most fundamental requirement in the industrial policy
debate that is now beginning to take place in Scotland is the realisation that
it is an industrial policy that is required, and not merely some variant of
existing r.egional policies. In retrospect, the economic rationale behind the
application of U.K. regional policy to Scotland, and indeed to other lagging
regions of the U.K., has been pretty minimal. The focus of past effort has
been essentially on improving the demand for labour in Scotland by
encouraging the inter-regional and inter-national mobility of enterprises,
and the central objective of the approach has been to reduce
unemployment by any means possible. This will in future be seen as one of
the curses of twentieth century Scottish economic policy-making,
primarily because it has resulted in a whole series of measures aimed at
treating the symptoms of industrial decline, rather than tackling the
underlying forces, constraints and factor rigidities that have been
responsible for the decline. Perha·ps this is being rather harsh on those
involved in developing the policies, for it is only recently, with the benefit of
hindsight, that we have come to see that a continuation of past policies is
likely to prove disastrous. There are two reasons. 
Firstly, the old golden days of mobile industry within the U.K. being used
as the spearhead of regional policy are gone.Areas such as the South-East
and the West Midlands, where the recent recession pushed up
unemployment rates to "development area" levels, are now becoming
increasingly resentful about much of their industrial growth being sent to
other areas of the U.K. Their demands to retain such new industry as is
created are likely to become ever louder , and are almost certain to
figure strongly in the economic component of any English backlash on the
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devolution issue. Secondly, manufacturing industry is becoming more 
capital intensive, and thus there will be fewer new manufacturing jobs 
made available for distribution to the regions by any future regional policy. 
Further, the competition for these jobs is likely to be fierce. The only 
sensible way of proceeding in such a situation is to develop a much greater 
industrial component in Scottish development policies, and specifically, 
these must aim at attacking the major industrial constraints, which as we 
have seen above, lie overwhelmingly on the supply side. The types of action 
that are required are perhaps too complex and technical to be discussed 
here, but they must include measures to improve the prospects for 
entrepreneurs: they must aim at supporting industrial success rather than 
failure; and must accept that Scotland has become a mixed economy that is 
firmly and irretrievably integrated with the rest of the U.K. In general 
terms, the best way of achieving a measure of success with such industrial 
policies would seem to lie in adopting what economists term a 
micro-orientated approach to industrial strategy, but this, as noted above, 
requires better information on the detailed changes that are taking place 
within companies. It also requires a much closer relationship between 
government and companies: this does not mean however greater 
government intervention in the old-fashioned sense of the word, but rather 
a much more detailed understanding of what is going on. One major 
immediate priority must be the inclusion of a Scottish component in the 
national (U.K.) industrial strategy that is currently being evolved by the 
central government. 
On the urban side, the prospects for_ a major initiative to solve the 
deep-rooted problems of the older inner areas of Scottish cities have 
improved immeasurably. The recent long overdue cancellation of plans to 
develop Stonehouse into a New Town is perhaps the first step towards a 
reconcentration of resources towards the needs of the existing cities, and 
the decision by the Scottish Office to launch a massive £140 mn. 
redevelopment programme in Glasgow's East End offers the chance for a 
real breakthrough in trying to revivify the economy of Scotland's most 
important industrial area. However, for such an urban redevelopment 
programme to succeed, a number of prior conditions are obviously 
necessary. Firstly, there must be some agreement about the goals and 
objectives of the overall programme, and a much greater determination to 
state the objectives with more precision. If goals are only vaguely 
specified, then no matter how laudable the intentions behind the 
programme, and no matter how committed the administrators involved in 
implementing the policy, it will still be difficult to measure the 
achievement of objectives. In the past, political pressures have often 
prevented goals being specified, because non-achievement can mean 
political ruin. In the future we must get round this particular 
self-destructive approach, and try to achieve a greater degree of consensus 
on objectives so that long-term programmes in areas like urban 
development are not being constantly revised for political motives alone. 
Secondly, an urban programme- especially one centred on Clydeside-









being il)jected into it, not merely for physical planning ends such as
housing, but also for programmes designed to stimulate industry of the
type outlined above. A major urban development programme could, after
all, provide an important stimulus to industrial growth in its own right, if a
conscious policy was adopted of maximising local involvement. But to have
any chance of success, experience in development economics indicates
that such a programme must have a relatively big impact over a relatively
short space of time, and this can only be achieved if a conscious decision is
made to shift a substantial amount of Scotland's resources into this area.
This in turn requires a review of our public expenditure programmes
(especially now that the Layfield Report on Local Government Finance has
been published) and this is in practice unlikely until the Scottish Assembly
has been established. What can be predicted is that an urban development
programme of this type could become Scotland's dominant domestic policy
concern throughout the last part of this century. 
Finally, what about the complex question of oil and gas, and its impact on
the Scottish economy? Many of the variables involved here are overtly
political by nature, and thus I would not want to introduce them here.
Certainly, as was noted above, the direct impact in terms of job creation
may already have reached its maximum. For the level to rise further would
imply almost unbelievably optimistic estimates of future exploration and
production activity; of platform ordering; and of the export prospects for
Scottish-made offshore equipment. In fact, an economist reviewing the
Scottish economy in 2000 A.D. (which is closer to us than the Second World
War! ) may conclude that the way the oil and gas issue has been handled in
Scotland offers a perfect example of how not to do things. I tis already clear
that some fundamental mistakes- some of which were predictable- have
been made, and of these the most glaring concerns the policy towards
production platform sites. Even in the most optimistic days of exploration
activity there were those who warned of the dangers of having too many
sites designated; of possible future shortages of orders; of the problems
involved in ignoring technological change; and of the permanent damage
that might well be done to isolated communities suddenly faced with a
large-scale influx of employment of an inherently temporary nature.
Events have proved that these cynics were right, and that many of the
"experts" trotted forward by the government departments involved were
wrong. The events at Kishorn have, for example, shown that "economic
necessity'' can run rings round, over and through planning conditions
unless very tight control is exercised; and I would be personally very
surprised if the Committee of Public Accounts did not investigate the
complete waste of public funds involved in the Portvadie and Hunterston
platform sites. There is anyway now growing agreement that large
offshore platforms may turn out to be something of a temporary
phenomenon, as the speed of technological change in offshore engineering
is exceptionally high. 
Unfortunately, all the evidence seems to show that Scottish companies,
with a few notable exceptions, have not contributed much to developing
new and original offshore technologies, and thus there is now a distinct
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possibility that the oil and gas industry will have passed industrial Scotland 
by. I would also suggest that hopes of the large-scale exporting of 
scottish-made offshore products to other oil and gas provinces, especially 
those in the third world, may prove to be slightly misplaced, in that many of 
the countries that are moving into offshore exploration, such as India and 
China, have well-developed engineering industries that are keen to break 
into these new areas, and governments that place importance on 
import-substitution as a means of conserving scarce foreign-exchange. In 
such conditions joint ventures or licensing becomes important, and this 
normally requires the possession of the relevant technology, or at the very 
least exceptionally good financing facilities and terms. Thus, we have to 
look towards Scottish involvement in the oil and gas revenues as being the 
way in which the major economic impact will come, and this is essentially a 
political question; or towards greater Scottish involvement in the 
downstream processing activities, and this is one area where I think we 
should look for more state participation via the Scottish Development 
Agency or the British National Oil Corporation 
In conclusion, it can be said that the recent development of some 
reservations about the underlying strength of Scotland's economic position 
does not in any way mean that there is cause for alarm, and it certainly 
should not force us into taking an alternative and more pessimistic view of 
future prospects. Indeed, the development of some caution is to be 
encouraged if it results in a more realistic attitude being taken towards 
both the problems and potential of the Scottish economy, and if it raises the 
standard of debate about the types of policies that will be required to 
achieve the fundamental restructuring of the Scottish economy that most 
observers agree is necessary. 
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